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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Mr. Hilario Guel's judgment of conviction and sentence for 
domestic battery and attempted strangulation enhanced by the finding that he was a persistent 
violator. 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Guel and Melissa Davidson began dating in 2007 and eventually Ms. Davidson 
moved into Mr. Guel's residence. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 98, In. 4- p. 100, ln. 10. Ms. Davidson had a 
violent temper and particularly when drinking - would go into irrational rages during which 
she became physically combative. See id. at p. 107, In. 8-11; 597, In. 1-14; p. 378, In. 18-20; p. 
620, In. 16-25; p. 639, In. 1 1; p. 647, In. 20 - p. 660, In. 4; p. 685, In. 23 p. 686, In. 3; p. 733, 
In. 23 - 734, In. 21. In May 2008, Ms. Davidson was drunk and wanted to leave the residence in 
her vehicle with her minor children. Id. at p. 732, In. 7 - p. 733, ln. 3. Concerned for the 
children's safety, Mr. Guel refused to allow Ms. Davidson to leave and restrained her in order to 
prevent her from obtaining the keys. Id. at p. 620, ln. 2 - p. 621, In. · p. 733, In. 4 - p. 737, In. 
19. Mr. Guel received numerous scratches, bites and other injuries as a result of his efforts to 
prevent Ms. Davidson from leaving the residence in her vehicle. Id. at p. 621, In. 8-9, In. 21-25; 
741, In. 20-22; Exhibits G-I. Eventually, Ms. Davidson returned to her senses and Mr. Guel 
released her. Id. at p. 621, ln. 6 - 19. 
In June 2009, Ms. Davidson and Mr. Guel argued and Ms. Davidson hit and kicked Mr. 
Guel. Id. at p. In. 14 p. 754, In. 25. Mr. Guel punched Ms. Davidson in the face and held 
Ms. Davidson to the ground. Id. at p. 755, In. l-24. A roommate walked into the bedroom and 
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called police who arrived shortly thereafter. Id. at p. 103, ln. 11-17; 755, ln. 21- p. 756, In. 19. 
Mr. Guel was charged with misdemeanor domestic battery to which he pied guilty. Id. at p. 827, 
In. 6-17. 
In July 2009, Ms. Davidson and Mr. Guel argued while Ms. Davidson rode on the back of 
Mr. Guel's motorcycle in heavy traffic. Id. at p. 362, ln. 1 - p. 363, ln. 7; p. 768, ln. 23 - 769, ln. 
15. While stopped at a light, Ms. Davidson got off the motorcycle, fell to the ground and got into 
another car. Id. at p. 363, In. 10 - p. 364, ln. 8; p. 771, In. 14 - 25; p. 773, 16. Mr. Guel returned 
to their residence, which was a short distance alone on the motorcycle. Id. at p. 774, ln. 9-20. 
Ms. Davidson got out of the vehicle and returned to the residence on foot. Id. at p. 364, In. 8 -
12. When she arrived, Ms. Davidson was in a rage and pounded on the door. Id. at p. 376, ln. 
14-25; p. 775, ln. 11. Another physical encounter occurred and police were called to the 
residence. Id. at p. 380, ln. 2 - 392, ln. 6; p. 776, ln. 23 - p. 794, In. 6. 
Mr. Guel was charged with domestic battery resulting in a traumatic injury and leaving 
the scene of an injury accident under the theory that he accelerated his motorcycle as Ms. 
Davidson disembarked and then left the scene of the accident knowing she was injured. R. 29-
37. The state charged Mr. Guel with a second count of domestic battery resulting in traumatic 
injury, attempted strangulation and destruction of a telecommunication device for his alleged 
conduct during the subsequent argument in the residence. Id. The state also charged Mr. Guel 
with a misdemeanor for violating the no contact order imposed as a result of the June 2009 
incident. Id. The state alleged that Mr. Guel was a persistent violator based on convictions from 
1977 and 1983. R. 51-52. 
In August 2009, Ms. Davidson battered a roommate and police were called to the 
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residence. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 450, ln. 16 p. 451, ln. 20. Ms. Davidson refused to cooperate with the 
responding officers and she struck, kicked and pinched the officers. I !er combative behavior 
continued at the police station. id. at p. 450, In. 20 - p. 452, ln.9. 
Mr. Guel who remained in custody awaiting trial - and Ms. Davidson were permitted to 
correspond in writing and both understood that their letters were monitored. Id. at p. 401, In. 11-
p. 402, ln. 4. At some point, Mr. Guel's first attorney delivered a letter to Ms. Davidson from 
Mr. Guel. id. at p. 402, In. 5 p. 403, In. 1. This letter describes a plan discussed by Mr. Guel 
and his attorney concerning Ms. Davidson's testimony and it suggests the manner in which she 
should testify and how she should behave during trial. Id. at p. 409, ln. 21 - 413, In. The 
attorney withdrew from the case early in the proceedings. R. 50. Ms. Davidson provided the 
letter to Mr. Guel's new attorney. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 32, ln. 1-2. 
Later, Ms. Davidson informed the prosecutor of the letter's existence. See id. at p. 31, In. 
11-18. The prosecutor then filed a specific request for discovery requesting any and all letters 
that Mr. Guel had wTitten to Ms. Davidson while incarcerated. R. 126. Mr. Guel objected, 
indicating that ldaho Criminal Rule 16( c )(1) only requires the defense to disclose tangible objects 
which he intends to introduce as evidence and that he did not intend to introduce any such letters. 
R. 141. The district court overruled Mr. Guel's objection and ordered him to produce the letter. 
148. The district court also overruled Mr. Guel's objections, in limine, to the state's introduction 
of evidence of the June 2009 incident pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the state's 
introduction of expert testimony that domestic violence victims recant and minimize. R. 98-106; 
114-120. 
Mr. Guel sought to introduce evidence of Ms. Davidson's battery of her roommate and 
,.., 
.) 
police officers in August 2009 and the May 2008 incident. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 424, ln. 20 - p. 425, ln. 
13. Mr. Guel asserted that such evidence was admissible to illustrate Ms. Davidson's propensity 
for violence in order to support his defense that she was the first aggressor and that he acted in 
self-defense. Id. Mr. Guel also contended that the evidence was admissible to rebut the state's 
evidence regarding the June 2009 incident. Id. at p. 438, ln. 7-16. The district court precluded 
any evidence of Ms. Davidson's propensity for violence through testimony of specific incidences 
and limited such evidence to testimony concerning opinion and reputation. Id. at p. 461 - p. 463. 
The district court permitted Mr. Guel to introduce evidence of the May 2008 incident. Id. at p. 
462, ln. 24 - p. 463, ln. 8. 
Following trial, the jury acquitted Mr. Guel of the domestic battery count concerning Ms. 
Davidson's fall from the motorcycle, leaving the scene of an injury accident and destruction of a 
telecommunications device. R. 199-200, 203. The jury found that Mr. Guel was guilty of 
attempted strangulation, the second domestic battery count, violating a no contact order and 
being a persistent violator. R. 198, 201-02, 204. The district court sentenced Mr. Guel to 
concurrent unified terms of 20 years with 10 years determinate. R. 218. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Was Mr. Guel harmed by the district court's erroneous ruling that his letter to Ms. 
Davidson was subject to disclosure pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16? 
B. Was Mr. Guel harmed by the district court's error in permitting the state to 
introduce expert testimony opining that domestic violence victims recant and minimize? 
C. Was Mr. Guel harmed by the district court's error in permitting the state to 
introduce evidence of the June 2009 incident pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b )? 
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D. Did the district court's error in refusing to permit Mr. Guel to introduce evidence 
of Ms. Davidson's battery of her roommate and police officers in August 2009 deprive him of his 
due process right to a fair trial? 
E. Did the combination of errors and irrcgularics deprive Mr. Guel of his due process 
right to a fair trial? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Guel Was Harmed by the District Court's Erroneous Ruling That His Letter to 
Ms. Davidson Was Subject to Disclosure Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 requires a defendant to disclose tangible objects which he intends 
to introduce in trial. The district court acknowledged that Mr. Guel's letter to Ms. Davidson was 
not subject to Rule 16's plain wording but nonetheless ordered Mr. Guel to produce it because he 
could not "thwart or hinder the State's investigation by withholding information not otherwise 
protected by privilege." R. 153. Regardless of whether Mr. Guel could have been ordered to 
produce the letter under a different procedure, the letter was not subject to disclosure under Rule 
16 in his prosecution for his alleged conduct in July 2009. Moreover, the letter was highly 
prejudicial and there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Guel would have been acquitted of all 
charges had the letter not been introduced into evidence. Accordingly, the district court's error in 
ordering Mr. Guel to produce the letter in response to the state's specific request for discovery 
requires reversal of his judgment of conviction and sentences. 
1. The letter was not subject to disclosure pursuant to Rule 16 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16( c) provides that "the defendant shall at any time following the 
filing of charges against the defendant, upon written request by the prosecuting attorney, 
disclose" papers and documents, "which arc within the possession, custody or control of the 
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defendant, and ·which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." (Emphasis 
added.) This rule places a substantially more onerous burden on the state, requiring the 
prosecutor to disclose tangible objects which are in its possession, custody or control and "which 
are material to the preparation of the defense, or intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at 
trial, or obtained from or belonging to the defendant." I.C.R. l 6(b )( 4). The state must produce 
evidence that "tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would 
tend to reduce the punishment therefor" even in the absence of a written request. LC.R. 16(a). 
Here, the state filed a discovery request pursuant to Rule 16 that requested "any and all 
letters" that Ms. Davidson " has provided to defense counsel that [Mr. Guel] has written to her 
while incarcerated." R. 126. Mr. Guel did not intend to introduce the letter at issue as evidence 
in trial and, thus, Rule 16 plainly did not require him to disclose it in response to the state's 
request. In overruling Mr. Guel 's objection, the district court found Mr. Guel's "urged 
interpretation of the Rule reasonable, given the plain language of the Rule. However, the Court 
finds this result, taken to its logical conclusion is palpably absurd and clearly contrary to the 
Rule's intent." R. 150-51. The district court noted that I.C.R. 2 notes that the criminal rules arc 
intended "to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding" and "shall be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration." R. 151. The district 
court reasoned that Mr. Guel's position (and the plain language of the rule) would be contrary to 
the rules' intent to provide fairness in the proceedings. Id. 
In essence, the district court disregarded the plain language of Ruic 16 because it found 
the rule was unfair because it places a higher burden of disclosure on the state than the defense. 
These differing burdens reflect the special protections afforded all citizens when the state seeks 
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to deprive him or her of her liberty, including the presumption of innocence and the state's 
burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In support of its conclusion, the district court "digress[ ed]" into a discussion of privilege 
and found neither attorney client privilege nor the privilege against self-incrimination protected 
the letter. R. ] 51. The district court then analogized the letter to cases discussing attorneys' 
obligation to produce the instrumentalities of crimes. The district court concluded: 
R. 153. 
the State has now been made aware of this letter [to Ms. Davidson] and makes a 
reasonable discovery request to view the letter. Counsel's continued refusal to 
produce the letter could be fairly viewed as actively hindering the prosecutions 
investigation ... While this Court finds the most proper procedure for obtaining 
possible evidence of a crime is through the warrant or subpoena process, and 
urges the State to utilize these tools rather than create future appealable issues, it 
finds a reasonable interpretation of the rules of discovery would not protect [Mr. 
Guel] from' disclosing this third-party communication. 
Whether the state could have compelled disclosure of the letter via warrant or subpoena 
in a criminal investigation into whether Mr. Guel violated the law prohibiting influencing a 
witness was not before the district court. Rather, the state requested the letter in discovery in 
preparation for a trial involving Mr. Guel's alleged conduct months before the letter was written. 
While the letter was helpful to the state, it cannot be analogized to an "instrumentality" of the 
crimes with which Mr. Guel was charged. Rule 16 only requires defendants to produce evidence 
in their possession for the state's inspection when they intend to introduce the same at trial. The 
letter was not subject to disclosure under Rule 16 and the district court erred in concluding 
otherwise. 
2. The letter contributed to the verdict 
This Court must reverse Mr. Guel's conviction unless the state can prove that the letter 
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did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010). The letter was highly inflammatory and prejudicial, particularly 
to Mr. Guel' s credibility. Further, the case was hotly contested and, as evidenced by the jury's 
acquittal on three charges, the jury had difficulty crediting Ms. Davidson's testimony and sorting 
the various versions of what occurred. Accordingly, had the letter not been introduced into 
evidence, the jury would have acquitted Mr. Guel on the remaining charges and the district 
court's erroneous ruling that Mr. Guel produce that letter under Rule 16 requires that his 
conviction be vacated. 
B. Mr. Guel Was Harmed by the District Court's Error in Permitting the State to 
Introduce Expert Testimony Opining That Domestic Violence Victims Recant and 
Minimize 
Prior to trial, the state filed a memorandum explaining its intent to utilize a detective to 
testify as an expert in the area of domestic violence. The state asserted that expert testimony 
regarding domestic violence would give jurors specialized knowledge to assist them in 
evaluating Ms. Davidson's credibility and the context and nature of a domestic violence 
relationship. R. 91. Mr. Guel objected to such testimony and distinguished the use of an expert 
in domestic violence to attack the credibility of an alleged victim's trial testimony from a case 
where such experts were used to support the claim of a domestic violence victim that she acted in 
self-defense against her abuser. Tr. (Vol. 4) p. 26, In. 12 - p. 27, ln. 16. Mr. Guel argued that a 
witness changing her story was within the jury's common experience and that permitting an 
expert to say that it is common for domestic violence victims to recant would infringe on the 
jury's ultimate responsibility to determine credibility. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 permits expcri testimony "if scientific, technical, or other 
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue." To be admissible, expert testimony must inform the jury about a matter that is 
outside the common experience and knowledge of a lay juror and will assist the jury in deciding 
a material issue in the case. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688. 694, 760 P.2d 27, 33 (1988); State v. 
Wright, 147 Idaho 150,155,206 P.3d 856,861 (Ct. App. 2009). Where the normal experience 
and qualification of lay jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from given facts and 
circumstances, expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 
853-54, 26 P.3d 31, 36-37 (2001); Hester, 114 Idaho at 696, 760 P.2d at 35. 
Even if evidence is admissible under Rule 702, however, it may be subject to exclusion if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as ''the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. This Court reviews the 
district court's decision allowing expert witness testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,245, 192 P.3d 1065, 1069 (2008). 
In Varie, the defendant was a domestic violence victim accused of murdering her 
husband/abuser. An expert testified regarding the reasons victims stay in abusive relationships, 
how victims perceive themselves and their abuser, how victims of abuse might perceive cues of 
their abuser, and how victims feel and react during abusive situations. Varie, 135 Idaho at 854, 
26 P.3d at 3 7. This testimony assisted the jury to understand the defendant's circumstances in 
order to determine whether she acted as a reasonable and prudent person in those circumstances 
as required to prevail on her self-defense argument. Id. at 855, 26 P.3d at 38. 
Here, in contrast, the detective testified that victims of domestic violence often recant or 
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minimize the abuse in order to prevent the abuser from being punished. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 329, In. 
13 - 331, In. 17. However, the reasons that a spouse or partner may later change his or her story 
regarding a battery in order to protect a loved one arc within the understanding of the common 
juror. Further, unlike the situation in Varie, the jury did not need assistance to understand the 
reasonableness of ~is. Davidson's actions and, instead, the evidence was offered to evaluate her 
credibility, a function left solely to the jury. 
The detective's testimony concerning recantation and minimization explained factors and 
circumstances within the normal experience and qualification of lay jurors. Accordingly, the 
district court abused its discretion in permitting the state to present the detective's testimony. 
Moreover, the state relied on the detective's testimony to discredit Ms. Davidson's trial 
testimony, that tended to support Mr. Guel's self-defense claim, in favor of her out-of-court 
statements made on the day of the incident. See Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 919, In. 13-16; p. 921, ln. 6-8; p. 
941, ln. 1-2. The detective's testimony thus likely contributed to the verdict and its erroneous 
admission requires that Mr. Guel's judgment be vacated. 
C. Mr. Guel Was Harmed by the District Court's Error in Permitting the State to 
Introduce Evidence of the June 2009 Incident Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b) 
The state sought to introduce evidence of the June 2009 incident pursuant to LR.E. 
404(b), asserting that such evidence was relevant to Mr. Guel's intent to inflict a traumatic injury 
and to rebut his claim of self-defense. R. 61-62. The district court reasoned that the evidence 
was relevant to demonstrate that Mr. Guel was not acting in self-defense on the occasion at issue 
because on a previous occasion he was violent with Ms. Davidson in the absence of a self-
defense provocation. R. 103. The district court ruled that evidence of the June 2009 incident 
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was irrelevant and inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief: 
R. 104. 
unless the Defendant or his attorney make mention of self-defense, mistake, or 
accident, either directly or indirectly in opening statement, during presentation of 
the State's case in chief, or in presenting its defenses once the state has rested. If 
the Defendant or his attorney present such argument it will place the specific 
intent clement directly at issue and the State will be permitted to introduce 
evidence of the Defendant's conduct from June 2, 2009, in rebuttal. 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51,205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,564, 
165 P.3d 273,278 (2007). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith. I.R.E. 404(b); Field, 144 Idaho 
at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered 
for a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis. First, the trial court must determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact and whether 
the fact of another crime or wrong would be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning 
the crime charged, other than propensity. Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187; Field, 144 
Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 
403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence. 
Here, the district court concluded that "like the defendant in [State v. Hassett, 124 Idaho 
357, 859 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1993)], if [Mr. Guel] seeks to assert his theory of self-defense, 
accident or mistake, he will place the specific intent clement directly at issue and make his prior 
actions relevant." R. 104. However, in Hassett, the defendant claimed that he did not intend to 
injure a child because he was performing CPR and the child's injuries were therefore an accident. 
11 
Hassett, I Idaho at 362, 859 P.2d at 960. 
Conversely, self-defense is an affirmative defense and, as such. a defendant asserts that 
the crime is excused or justified even though all of the elements of the crime be proven. See 
State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 652-53, 798 P.2d 914, 934-35 (1990). Thus, in claiming sclf-
dcfense, Mr. Guel did not place his intent to inflict traumatic inj urics at issue but, rather, claimed 
that the battery was justified because he used reasonable force to protect himself against Ms. 
Davidson's violence. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Guel's 
assertion of self-defense placed the intent element at issue and justified the state's introduction of 
evidence of the June 2009 incident pursuant to Rule 404(b). 
Moreover, evidence of the June 2009 incident was only relevant to Mr. Guel has 
a propensity for violence. To be relevant as a common scheme or plan, events must be linked by 
common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must 
objectively tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts. State v. Johnson, 148 
Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d 918, 922(2010). In Johnson, a lewd conduct case, the Court noted that 
the facts that the two victims were juvenile females and that the defendant was a family member 
were "sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan"' 148 Idaho at 668, 
227 P.3d at 922. 
Similarly, the common elements of the June and July incidents were that Ms. Davidson 
and Mr. Guel argued and the confrontation became physical. Such a description describes almost 
all incidents of domestic violence and there was nothing remarkable about the two incidents such 
as to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. 
The June 2009 incident was not relevant to a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b) and 
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the district court erred in concluding otherwise. Moreover, the prejudicial effect of character 
evidence is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the 
crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 
1188. Character evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from their primary consideration of the 
guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial. Id. 
This danger was particularly present here, where the evidence and credibility were hotly 
contested and the jury struggled to determine who and what to believe. The evidence of the June 
2009 incident the state was permitted to introduce, which included photos and testimony from 
several witnesses, was highly prejudicial and encouraged the jury to conclude that Mr. Guel was 
a violent man. Accordingly, this evidence likely contributed to the verdict and this Court must 
vacate Mr. Guel' s conviction. 
D. The District Court's Refusal to Permit Mr. Guel to Introduce Evidence of Ms. 
Davidson's Battery of Her Roommate and Police Officers in August 2009 Was 
Erroneous and Deprived Him of His Right to a Fair Trial 
Mr. Guel sought to introduce evidence of an incident that occurred in August of 2009 in 
which Ms. Davidson battered her roommate as well as the police officers who responded to the 
scene. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 450, In. 6-24; p. 451, In. 21- p. 452, In. 9. The roommate was in his room 
when Ms. Davidson entered and began battering him. Id. at p. 450, In. 25 - p. 451, In. 4. The 
roommate called 911 as Ms. Davidson punched and bit him. Id. at p. 451, In. 4-7. Police arrived 
and instructed Ms. Davidson to sit on the couch. Id. at p. 451, In. 8-23. Ms. Davidson refused, 
an officer attempted to restrain her and she struck him. Id. at p. 451, In. 23-25. Police took Ms. 
Davidson to the floor as she kicked, hit and pinched the officers. Id. at p. 451, In. 25 - p. 452, 
ln.3. Eventually, police placed Ms. Davidson in a police car and transported her to the police 
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station where her combative behavior continued. Id. at p. 452, ln.3-9. 
Mr. Guel contended that evidence of this incident was admissible to prove that Ms. 
Davidson had a violent character, which was relevant to support his self-defense claim that she 
was the first aggressor. Id. at p. 424, In. 20 - p. In. 5. Mr. Guel argued that evidence of 
specific incidents of Ms. Davidson's violent conduct was admissible under LR.E. 404(a)(2), 
which permits character evidence of a pertinent trait of an alleged victim and I.R.E. 405(b ), 
which permits specific evidence of conduct to prove a character trait when the trait is an essential 
element of a defense. Id. at p. 424, In. 20 - p. 425, In. 13. The district court ruled that Mr. Guel 
could introduce evidence of Ms. Davidson's violent character through opinion and reputation 
evidence but precluded him from introducing evidence of any specific incidences of Ms. 
Davidson's violent conduct, except evidence regarding the May 2008 incident. Id. at p. 462, In. 
24 p. 463, In. 8. The district court further concluded that evidence of Ms. Davidson's conduct 
that occurred subsequent to the charged incident was inadmissible under Rule 404(a)(2) and 
405(a). Id. at p. 461, In. 12-18. 
As illustrated by this case, testimony about the victim's prior acts of violence can be more 
reliable and of more assistance to the jury in determining the victim's propensity for violence 
than reputation and opinion evidence. Thus, although the Court of Appeal previously held that 
specific incidents of conduct are not an essential element of a self-defense claim for purposes of 
Rule 405(6) in State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 30 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2001), this Court should 
re-visit that decision (if assigned to the Court of Appeals) or decline to follow it (if assigned to 
the Supreme Court). 
Further, evidence of Ms. Davidson's battery on her roommate and law enforcement, 
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which occurred just three weeks after the incident at issue was highly probative of Ms. 
Davidson's violent and quarrelsome nature as it related to Mr. Guel' s claim that she was the first 
aggressor. Accordingly, the district court erred in refusing to permit Mr. Guel to present 
testimony of the August 2009 incident. 
Moreover, particularly because the state was permitted to present substantial evidence of 
the June 2009 incident which suggested that Mr. Guel was violent and expert testimony that 
bolstered Ms. Davidson's out-of-court statement regarding the occurrence, the inability to present 
this evidence deprived Mr. Guel of his due process right to a fair trial. Because the state would 
be unable to show that the inability to present this evidence did not contribute to the verdict, Mr. 
Guel's judgment of conviction must be reversed. 
1. Specific incidents of conduct were admissible under Rules 404(a)(2) and 
405(b) 
A person accused of a crime may present evidence of a pertinent character trait of an 
alleged victim when such evidence is offered by the accused. I.R.E. 404(a)(2). Thus, a 
defendant in a criminal prosecution may introduce evidence of a trait of the victim's character in 
order to raise an inference that the victim acted consistently with that trait on the occasion in 
question. State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
admissibility of such evidence to substantiate a self-defense claim is well recognized and the 
rule's probable intended application was to allow evidence of an individual's violent disposition 
to suggest an inference that the person was the aggressor in an affray. See Hernandez, 133 Idaho 
at 584, 990 P.2d at 750; see also Com. v. Adjutant, 824 N.E2d 1, 8 (Mass. 2005) (noting an 
"overwhelming trend" toward admitting some form of evidence of a victim's violent disposition 
as a result of "the view that evidence reflecting the victim's propensity for violence has 
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substantial probative value and will help the jury identify the first aggressor when the 
circumstances of the altercation are in dispute"). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 405 provides that: 
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof 
may also be made of specific instances of the person's conduct. 
Rule 405(b) thus allows proof of a person's character through evidence concerning 
specific instances of conduct when the character trait is an essential element of a defense. 
In Custodio, the Court of Appeals addressed whether a victim's propensity for violence is 
an essential element of a claim of self-defense within the meaning of Rule 405(b ). The Comi 
adopted the reasoning in United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 84 7 (9th Cir. 1995), 1 which framed the 
relevant question as whether proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself would 
actually satisfy an element of the defense. Custodio, 136 Idaho at 204, 30 P.3d at 982. The 
Court acknowledged that evidence relating to the victims' violent character was relevant for the 
purpose of inferring that the victims acted in conformity therewith. However, because proof of 
the victims' violent character standing alone would not establish that they were the first 
aggressors, the district court did not err in excluding evidence of the victims' propensities for 
violence pursuant to Rule 405. 
The interpretation of Rule 405 adopted by Custodio and applied by the district court 
1 Although the district court did not cite to Custodio in concluding specific incidents of 
violent conduct were not admissible under I.R.E. 405(b), it relied on federal cases adopting the 
same interpretation of the federal rule adopted by the Custodio Court. (Vol. 3) p. 457, In. 17 -
p. 460, ln. 7. 
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thwarts the just administration of justice and should either be overturned or disavowed. As 
recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, testimony about the victim's prior acts of 
violence can be convincing and reliable evidence of the victim's propensity for violence. 
Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d at 12. In determining whether to permit evidence of specific violent acts to 
prove a victim's character, the Adjutant Court identified the arguments against admitting such 
evidence to include ( 1) the danger of ascribing character traits to a victim with proof of isolated 
incidents, (2) the worry that jurors will be invited to acquit the defendant on the improper 
ground, (3) the potential for wasting time trying collateral questions surrounding the victim's past 
conduct, (4) the unfair difficulty of rebuttal by the prosecution, and (5) the strategic imbalance 
that flows from the inability of prosecutors to introduce similar evidence of the defendant's prior 
bad acts. Adjutant, 824 N .E.2d at 11. 
These concerns are not that distinct from those surrounding the admission of prior bad 
acts and impeachment evidence and are best addressed by the discretion of trial judges to exclude 
marginally relevant or grossly prejudicial evidence and prevent the undue exploration of 
collateral issues. See Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d at 12-13; see also United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 
432 (D.C.Cir.1972) (holding that in homicide case, evidence of dcceased's violent character, 
including evidence of specific violent acts, is relevant on issue of who was first aggressor). Prior 
acts that demonstrate a propensity for initiating violence can be very significant to the first 
aggressor issue and their number can be controlled by the trial court's discretion. Conversely, 
reputations or opinions are often formed based on rumor or other unreliable hearsay sources, 
without any personal knowledge on the part of the person holding that opinion. 
This case is illustrative. Several witnesses testified that Ms. Davidson has a propensity 
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for violence. Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 597, ln. 1-14; p. 639, ln. 1 1; p. 647. ln. 20 - p. 660, ln. 4; p. 685, 
ln. 23 - p. 686, ln. 3. The prosecutor's cross examination suggested these witnesses were biased 
in Mr. Guel's favor. See id Without any background or context to these witnesses' opinions, 
their testimony was of minimal assistance to the jury in determining whether Ms. Davidson was 
the first aggressor in the July 2009 incident between her and Mr. Guel. Conversely, the 
roommate and police officers' testimony regarding Ms. Davidson's behavior shortly after the 
incident at issue would have been objective, reliable and far more useful in illustrating whether 
Ms. Davidson had a propensity for initiating violence. The time spent delving into this collateral 
issue would have been no different than the effort spent on evidence of the June 2009 incident 
and objective evidence of Ms. Davidson's propensity to initiate violence all the more necessary 
to the defense in light of that evidence. 
Moreover, Custodio 's interpretation of Rule 405(b) that the clement of the defense must 
stand or fall with evidence of character alone is unreasonably restrictive. Other states have 
adopted a more reasonable interpretation of Rule 405 (b)' s requirement that a character trait be an 
essential element of a charge, claim or defense by requiring that the evidence directly relate to an 
essential element of the charge, claim or defense. State v. Le,vchuk, 539 N. W.2d 847, 853-
54 (Neb. App. 1995) (trial court should have permitted evidence of victim's specific violent acts 
because whether the victim was the first aggressor was an essential element of defendant's 
self-defense claim pursuant to Nebraska Evidence Rule 405(6)); State v. Dunson, 433 N. W.2d 
676, 680-81 (Iowa 1988) (holding that evidence of victims specific acts of violence by victim, 
which occurred subsequent to assault charged, was admissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 
405(6) because victim's aggressive character and propensity for violence was material to several 
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clements of defense). Indeed, it is unclear what, if any, charges or defense would be established 
by proof of a character trait standing alone and Custodio' s interpretation thus renders Rule 405(b) 
a nullity. 
Establishing that Ms. Davidson was the first aggressor in the July 2009 incident was an 
essential element of Ms. Guel' s claim of self-defense. Evidence of another occasion in which 
Ms. Davidson initiated violence demonstrated her propensity for initiating violence and was 
material to whether she initiated the confrontation in July 2009. Accordingly, evidence of that 
incident was admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 404(a) and 405(b) and the district court erred in 
excluding that evidence. 
2. Subsequent acts arc relevant to character for violence and quarrelsomeness 
In precluding evidence of specific acts of violence, the district court reasoned "this is 
especially true in this Court's opinion when this incident of conduct did not occur until after the 
crime with which the defendant is charged had taken place." Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 460, In. 10-13. The 
district court recognized that subsequent bad acts are not inadmissible under Rule 404(b) but 
found a comparable rule was not warranted because a character trait "is not formed on the basis 
of any single act as a bad act under 405(b) may clearly be." Id. at p. 461, In. 12-21. 
However, under Rule 404(a), a criminal defendant may introduce evidence of a trait of 
the victim's character in order to raise an inference that the victim acted consistently with that 
trait on the occasion in question. Evidence of a person's violent behavior on a single occasion is 
certainly relevant to the person's propensity for violence, particularly when viewed in 
combination with evidence of other similar acts. "There is no difficulty from the point of view of 
the relevancy of character [whether the violent occurred subsequent to the act at issue]; a man's 
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trait or disposition a month or a year after a certain date is as evidential of his trait on that date as 
his nature a month or a year before that date; because character is a more or less permanent 
quality ... we may make inferences from it either forward or backward." People v. Shoemaker, 
135 Cal. App.3d 442, 448, 185 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (1982) and State v. Dunson, 433 N.W.2d 676 
(Iowa 1988) citing 5 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1618, at 595 (Chadbourn ed. 1974). 
In Dunson, the Court held that specific acts of violence by victim, even if subsequent to 
assault charged, are admissible and relevant to victim's aggressive character and propensity for 
violence under the Iowa version of Rule 405(b). The Court reasoned that: 
Because the evidence of [the victim's] subsequent act was consistent with her 
earlier violent behavior, the evidence might, to the jury, have shown that [the 
defendant] reasonably believed he needed to defend himself at the earlier time, 
that he had indeed withdrawn from physical contact during the fight with the vase, 
or that [the victim's] responsive acts were grossly disproportionate to the 
provocation. 
For example, the evidence gave credence to [the defendant] belief that he 
was, at the earlier time, in imminent danger of serious injury. [The victim's] act 
with the automobile was consistent with her violent behavior toward [the 
defendant] at other times. While they were living together, she admitted, they 
were "always fighting." We think the jury could have seen the evidence in 
question as part of the pattern of aggressive, even violent, behavior that apparently 
was a way oflife to [the defendant] and [the victim]. 
As in Dunson, the offer of proof concerning the August 2009 incident established conduct 
similar to the manner in which Mr. Guel testified that Ms. Davidson behaved in June and July. 
Testimony of the August 2009 incident when viewed with Ms. Davidson's own testimony 
concerning her conduct, evidence of the May 2008 incident as well as Mr. Guel's testimony 
would have illustrated a pattern of aggressive violent behavior. 
3. Exclusion deprived of due process right to fair trial 
In urging the district court to permit evidence of the August 2009 incident, Mr. Guel 
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argued that the state's case in chief largely concerned "a case other than the one we're dealing 
with today which implicates character evidence heavily." Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 438, ln. 7-16. In light of 
the state's evidence implicating Mr. Guel's character, he argued that fundamental fairness 
required that he be permitted to present similar evidence concerning Ms. Davidson, particularly 
where the rules permit evidence of a victim's character for quarrelsomeness and violence. 
The right to present a complete and meaningful defense is grounded in the Sixth 
Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
In essence, an accused's right to due process in a criminal trial is the right to a fair opportunity to 
defend against the state's accusations. Chambers v. Mississippi, 4] 0 U.S. 284,294 (1973); State 
v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 2003). Few rights arc more fundamental 
than that of an accused to present witnesses in his or her defense. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; 
Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 676, 67 P.3d at 1288. 
Thus, if application of rules of evidence deprives a criminal defendant of a fair 
opportunity to defend against the charge, the conviction cannot stand. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 
302-03, Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 676, 67 P.3d at 1288. A defendant establishes a violation of the 
constitutional right to present evidence by making a plausible showing of how testimony would 
have been both material and favorable to his defense. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 
U.S. 858,867 (1982); Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 676, 67 P.3d at 1288. The exclusion of the 
evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record -- if the verdict is already of 
questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt whereas a new trial is unwarranted if there is no reasonable doubt about 
guilt regardless of whether additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new 
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trial. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868; Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 676, 67 P.3d at 1288. 
Evidence is material for purposes of a Sixth Amendment compulsory process claim if it would 
create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that did not otherwise exist. Kerchusky, 138 
Idaho at 676, 67 P.3d at 1288; S'tate v. Garza, I 09 Idaho 40. 43, 704 P.2d 944, 947 (Ct. 
App.1985). 
Mr. Guel testified that Ms. Davidson would go into rages in which she was unaware of 
her surroundings and in which she became physically violent. This testimony was somewhat 
corroborated by Ms. Davidson's own testimony regarding her conduct. See Tr. (Vol. 3) p. 107, 
ln. 8-11; p. 377, In. 1-3; p. 378, In. 18-20. However, through its expert, the state was able to 
discredit any testimony from Ms. Davidson tending to accept blame regarding the incident. 
Evidence that Ms. Davidson had initiated a physical confrontation with a roommate and failed to 
respond to law enforcement commands substantially corroborated Mr. Guel's testimony that Ms. 
Davidson was the first aggressor in both the June and July 2009 incidents and that he acted in 
self-defense in July 2009. This evidence was particularly essential to Mr. Guel's defense because 
the witnesses - the roommate and the police officers - would have provided an objective 
viewpoint. Such evidence was essential to Mr. Guel's defense and to rebut the inferences 
regarding his propensity for violence through the state's extensive evidence concerning the June 
2009 incident. 
The roommate and police officers' testimony regarding Ms. Davidson's conduct in 
August 2009 would have given credence to Mr. Guel' s testimony that Ms. Davidson initiated the 
confrontation in July and that he acted reasonably in self-defense. This evidence would have 
provided a critical link in evidence regarding Ms. Davidson's pattern of aggressive and violent 
behavior. In excluding evidence of the August 2009 incident, the district court deprived Mr. 
Guel of his ability to meaningfully present his defense and his judgment of conviction must be 
vacated. 
E. The Doctrine of Cumulative Error Demonstrates That Mr. Guel Was Denied His 
Due Process Right to a Fair Trial 
The eumulati ve enor doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is an 
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, 
the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right 
to due process. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73, 165 P.3d 273, 286-87 (2007). Here, the 
errors discussed above cumulatively deprived Mr. Guel of his due process right to a fair trial, 
even if those errors were harmless when considered individually. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Guel respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
sentenees. 
Respectfully submitted this 21 day of November, 2011. 
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